Archive for the ‘Canada-Brevets-Patents’ Category

Statistiques de dépôts de brevets au Canada (local/étranger) et dépôts par des Canadiens à l’étranger

September 26, 2011

OMPI vient de publier de nouvelles statistiques détaillées par pays pour les périodes 1995-2009

Voir les statistiques pour le Canada

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Etude de l’impact de la transition “first-to-invent” à “first-to-file” au Canada entre 1984 et 1993 sur les dépôts de brevets

August 31, 2011

Voir l’étude de l’université de Pennsylvanie qui tente de déterminer si une telle transition aura des effets significatifs aux États-Unis qui considèrent un changement similaire, en comparant avec ce qui s’est passé au Canada.

Conclusion générale: peu d’impacts sauf une légère baisse du nombre de dépôts par des inventeurs individuels.

Le document est intéressant pour voir s’il y a eu des changements dans les profils des demandeurs entre 1984 et 1993 et maintenant:

Voici des tableaux extraits du rapport (cliquer sur la figure pour un zoom):

Par rapport aux Statistiques de l’OPIC en 2009-2010

Cour d’appel fédérale commente sur les arguments d’avocats en litige de brevets

August 30, 2011

Voir:  Phostech Lithium Inc. v. Valence Technology Inc. 2011 FCA 237

Extraits pertinents:

27]           Phostech’s argument with respect to claim 3 of the ‘115 Patent is a classic lawyer’s argument, namely that where a draftsman (or patent agent) uses different words, different meanings are intended. Counsel for Phostech put before us a table showing the various expressions used in the patent such as “ source of [element]”, “[element]-containing compound”, “[element] compound”, the point of which was to underline that the drafters of the patent referred only to “carbon” and did not include the qualifying words used in relation to other substances. From this, Phostech argued that where the patent refers to carbon, it means carbon in a pure form as opposed to some other compound which may be a source of carbon.

[34]           The fact that a lawyer, using the usual rules of interpretation, might come to a different conclusion, is of no consequence. The patent is not directed to lawyers but to persons skilled in the art. This principle is anchored in the language of the Patent Act itself (R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4, s. 27(3)(b) [emphasis added])

Article du Globe and Mail sur le contexte des récents achats de brevets pour des milliards de dollars

August 22, 2011

Voir l’article du Globe and Mail

Voir un schéma qui accompagne l’article

Et un article sur une possible fusion de joueurs en licensing de brevets au Canada

Un bon exemple d’opportunité de déposer un brevet manquée: les cônes oranges au Québec

August 2, 2011

Un bon exemple concret à citer à une personne qui hésite entre déposer une demande de brevet ou non.

Voir l’article de cyberpresse.ca

Dont voici des extraits intéressants:

Le modèle mis au point par Trafic Innovation a l’avantage de mieux résister aux collisions et d’être visible de tous les côtés. Il est donc possible de le voir même s’il a été déplacé par un contact avec une voiture. Le prototype est vite devenu la balise de choix du ministère des Transports.

«On a commencé avec une trentaine d’unités sur un chantier à Montréal-Est, relate Serge Daigneault, qui a lancé Trafic Innovation, mais qui a depuis quitté l’entreprise. La deuxième année, on en a produit 1000. Et la troisième année, on en a produit 45 000!»

Or, Trafic Innovation, dont le président Marc Laforce n’a pu être joint hier, n’a jamais breveté son invention. Et depuis, d’autres entreprises québécoises ont commencé à fabriquer leurs propres versions du «T-RV-7».

Les prix baissent

Résultat: les prix baissent. Il y a quelques années, un «T-RV-7» se détaillait aux alentours de 125 $, relatent deux entrepreneurs spécialisés dans le domaine. Aujourd’hui, la Société de services en signalisation SSS les vend entre 75 $ et 85 $ l’unité, selon la taille de la commande. C’est une chute d’environ 40%.

[…]

Et peut-être une indication qu’on apprend de nos erreurs:

M. Daignault a récemment breveté une nouvelle invention, un dispositif qui permet de déployer les cônes orange plus rapidement sur un chantier. Il entend commercialiser son nouveau bébé dans les prochains mois.

Collection d’outils de PI pour les compagnies exportatrices

July 27, 2011

Voir le site développé par l’Office de la propriété intellectuelle du Canada

Cour suprême des États-Unis: incitation à la contrefaçon requiert une preuve de connaissance

June 1, 2011

Voir: Global-Tech Appliances, inc. v. SEB S.A. (2011)

Éléments à retenir:

-Une accusation d’incitation à la contrefaçon en brevets aux États-Unis requiert une preuve de connaissance que les actes incités constituent bel et bien une contrefaçon d’un brevet

-Une preuve d’aveuglement volontaire peut constituer une preuve de connaissance

Voir le résumé de Patently-O

Une décision à contraster avec la récente jurisprudence canadienne dans Bauer Hockey Corp. v. Easton Sports Canada Inc. 2010 FC 361 (bien que cette décision a été portée en appel, la question d’incitation à la contrefaçon n’a pas été révisée en détail par la Cour d’appel fédérale)

[197]      The Court notes, however, that there is no case law stating clearly that one could not infringe by inducement or procurement unless it knew of the patent. Certainly even the case law referred to by Easton’s counsel does not require proof that the Defendant considered the patent valid and infringed. This would be an impossible burden to meet for a plaintiff. It would be easy for a defendant to find an obliging lawyer.

 [198]      Counsel for Bauer mentioned that this issue was argued before the Federal Court of Appeal in MacLennan above and that the Federal Court of Appeal, after reversing the trial judge on another issue, found the Defendant guilty of infringement by inducement and procurement without any evidence or mention of his knowledge of the Plaintiff’s patent. The Court has carefully reviewed all the previous decisions in that case and concludes that there is no finding in that respect in any of them.

 [199]      It is important to consider that inducing or procuring another to make or construct a patented invention is not a tort distinct from that of infringement. If it were, it could raise the jurisdictional issue alluded to by the Court in Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp. (1982), 66 C.P.R. (2d) 145, at p. 157-158, 15 A.C.W.S. (2d) 440 (F.C.T.D.).

 [200]      There is thus no legal rationale for requiring an “intent to infringe” on the part of the inducer or procurer. On the other hand, it is easy to understand why it would be required that the inducement be done knowingly – deliberately. In effect, it would be unjust to find a party guilty of infringement by inducement if that party did not know that its actions would induce another to do something that would later be held to constitute infringement.

 [201]      One can easily imagine cases where steps taken by a party could be misunderstood by another or that actions could be done by mistake. For example, one could simply suggest a design in the course of a meeting leaving the decision as to the final conception of the skates in the hands of one’s supplier. In such a case, one may not know that the suggestion will induce the person actually responsible for the conception to take steps that will ultimately be found to infringe. A direction or suggestion could easily be misconstrued.

 [202]      If this had been the case Easton could argue that they did not know that their suggestion would result in the infringing skate boots made at Rock Forest.

 [203]      To accept that this kind of infringement must not only be done deliberately, but also with knowledge of the patent is to create an unwarranted and unjustifiable distinction between companies who manufacture their own products and those who choose to have them manufactured by others[125] according to their detailed specifications. In the latter cases, these specifications can only lead to actions that will later be found to infringe.

 [204]      Mr. Goldsmith said that Rock Forest was quite a unique company. Bauer goes further to say that not only was it unique, but it effectively became the manufacturing arm of Easton.[126] It is clear that there was much more here than a simple contract of supply or purchase agreement. The following passage from the examination in chief of Mr. Laferrière[127] leaves one to wonder:

Q. Okay. So you spoke about some of the things that you provided to Rock Forest; what, if anything, did Rock Forest provide to you?

A. Well, they provided the help I needed to —

THE COURT: Manpower?

THE WITNESS: Manpower, yes.

THE COURT: Anything else?

THE WITNESS: An office, that’s about it.

 

 [205]      This case is very different and can be easily distinguished from all those referred to by Easton’s counsel. This has nothing to do with one party procuring or inducing another to use a combination by procuring one component of the combination. Here, through Mr. Laferrière’s involvement (as well later as that of Mr. Daniel Chartrand),[128] Easton was actually participating in the making of the skates that are now found to infringe.

 [206]      As such, while it is not necessary to come to a conclusion in the case at bar, it is worth mentioning for future consideration that in England the courts applied the concept of infringement “by common design”, a notion that also exists in Canada although it has not been applied in the context of a patent infringement action. In Unilever plc v. Gillette (UK) Limited, [1989] R.P.C. 583 (U.K.C.A.) at p. 609, Lord Mustill, then at the Court of Appeal of England, noted:

I use the words “common design” because they are readily to hand, but there are other expressions in the cases, such as “concerted action” or “agreed on common action” which will serve just as well. The words are not to be construed as if they formed part of a statute. They all convey the same idea. This idea does not, as it seems to me, call for any finding that the secondary party has explicitly mapped out a plan with the primary offender. Their tacit agreement will be sufficient. Nor, as it seems to me, is there any need for a common design to infringe. It is enough if the parties combine to secure the doing of acts which in the event prove to be infringements.

 Also, in such a context, knowledge of the patent would not be a prerequisite for a finding of infringement.

 [207]      Obviously, effective knowledge of the existence of a patent can be part of the overall circumstances one considers to determine whether or not a party deliberately induced another. In this case, Easton, after acquiring knowledge of the patent in December 2001, took no action to change its design or to make Rock Forest aware of the existence of such patent.

 [208]      Even more troubling is the fact that Easton’s Chinese supplier unilaterally decided to change the patterns used for Easton skate boots – adopting a two-piece quarter (see pattern B in P-14) sometime in 2003.[129] We do not know why Sakurai had decided to change the patterns, the answer given by Easton to an undertaking in that respect is given no weight as Easton never sought Sakurai’s explanation. Mr. Yang, who was initially scheduled to testify, could have shed some light on this issue. We know, however, that they reverted to the one-piece quarter in 2004.

 [209]      The Court concludes that in the very unique circumstances of this case, Easton is liable for infringing the ‘953 Patent in respect of all the skates manufactured at Rock Forest in accordance with Mr. Laferrière’s directions and specifications (pattern F in P-14).

L’homme du Clapham omnibus de l’affaire Beloit dans un article de La Presse hier

April 28, 2011

Je l’avais appris par coeur pour l’examen d’agent – mais j’avoue que je ne comprenais pas vraiment la référence à l’homme du “Clapham Omnibus” jusqu’à la lecture d’un article hier dans la Presse:

Rappel de l’extrait de Beloit:”The classical touchstone for obviousness is the technician skilled in the art but having no scintilla of inventiveness or imagination; a paragon of deduction and dexterity, wholly devoid of intuition; a triumph of the left hemisphere over the right. The question to be asked is whether this mythical creature (the man in the Clapham omnibus of patent law) would, in the light of the state of the art and of common general knowledge as at the claimed date of invention, have come directly and without difficulty to the solution taught by the patent. It is a very difficult test to satisfy.”

Voir l’article

Conférence le 20 avril à Montréal: jurisprudence récente en brevets

April 11, 2011

http://www.cba.org/pd/details.aspx?Lang=Fr&id=QC_TE110216

 20 AVRIL 2011

DÉJEUNER-CAUSERIE
Section
 : Information, télécommunications et propriété intellectuelle
Présidente : Me Marjolaine Gagnon

Conférencier :
Me Bob Sotiriadis, Robic

Sujet :
Cette conférence se veut un tour de piste des développements récents en matière de brevet. Bob Sotiriadis, avocat spécialisé en propriété intellectuelle ayant développé une expertise en litige de brevet, présentera les décisions les plus marquantes de l’année 2010 en matière de brevet, et donnera son avis et quelques trucs pratiques relativement à l’impact que ces décisions pourraient avoir sur la pratique de litige de brevet. Il est à noter que le conférencier ne traitera pas des décisions impliquant spécifiquement les “NOC”.  

Date et heure :
Le 20 avril 2011 
12 h 00 à 12 h 30 – DÉJEUNER
12 h 30 à 14 h 00 – CONFÉRENCE

Article sur la rédaction de revendications pour des logiciels au Canada/US/Europe

March 30, 2011

Voir l’article publié par MBHB

Collection d’information sur les programmes d’accélération d’examen de demandes de brevets pour technologies vertes

March 24, 2011

Programme récemment annoncé par le Bureau des brevets du Canada, voir le lien ici.

Voir l’article de Sim-McBurney qui résume les programmes existants dans d’autres juridictions: Article de Sim-McBurney

Statistiques de dépôt du Bureau des brevets pour 2009-2010

March 14, 2011

Voir les tableaux de statistiques qui datent du début du mois de mars

Rapport complet

Mémoire d’appel déposé par le Commissaire aux brevets dans l’affaire Amazon.com

March 9, 2011

Voir une copie du document sur le site IPPractice.ca

Jurisprudence récente CA: Est-ce OK de copier des extraits de revendications de d’autres brevets?

February 28, 2011

Une leçon: si vous copiez des extraits, les avocats vont s’en rendre compte…

Valence Technology, Inc. v. Phostech Lithium Inc., 2011 FC 174, (February 17, 2011) http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/en/2011/2011fc174/2011fc174.html

Voici des extraits intéressants du jugement:

[45]           In relation to Phostech’s arguments with regards to misappropriation (ss. 53(1) of the Patent Act), Phostech’s position is based on its belief that Valence’s patent agent clearly incorporated the claims of Hydro-Québec’s application (‘129) into the claims of the ‘366 Patent, including the use of the term “C-LiFePO4” in claim 73, which it alleges was taken from the ‘446 Application.

[…]

[208]      This is not a novel strategy for it is exactly what one would have had to do under section 43(2) before a conflict was declared. William Hayhurst’s chapter entitled “The Art of Claiming and Reading a Claim”[109] explains how it is the role of the patent agent to ensure, once he understands

the invention as explained by the inventor(s) including his or her preferred embodiments (often their product or processes), that the claims cover not only what the inventor(s) already contemplated, but also variances one could reasonably foresee in the future that could make use of the contribution of the inventor(s) to the art. This means that the patent agent will not only review the prior art, but will keep current of new publications and developments in the field throughout the patent’s prosecution. This also explains why one finds such a range of claims going from the widest claims that the agent can conceive of and that the Patent Office will allow, to the narrower claims that will cover, at the very least, the most likely competitive product or process.[110]

 

[209]      As mentioned by the distinguished authors, “[h]ence the old saw that ‘the inventor invents the product and the patent agent invents the invention’”.[111] This reflects the fact that, as mentioned by Mr. Hayhurst:

All too often the inventor does not understand the importance of claims or the niceties of claim drafting. All too often the inventor is content to ensure that the descriptive portion of the specification and any accompanying drawings are accurate, and that any prior art that may come to light can be distinguished, leaving the mysteries of claim drafting entirely to the agent. (p. 204)

 

[210]      Because patent agents are also required to be familiar with patent law and the requirements of the Patent Act, it is evident that they will prefer to draft claims at the same time as the disclosure

to avoid ambiguity and to ensure that the terms used in the claims are consistent with those used in  the disclosure. That said, however, claims are subject to negotiation with the Patent Examiner during prosecution for various reasons, substantive amendments are made such as those required in ss. 43(2) of the old Act. This often later created difficulties that Court’s will have to grapple with when construing the claims.  It will also raise the risk that the disclosure may be found inadequate (s. 27(3) / old s. 34). But this is what the patent agent must assess when claims from other applications or patents are included in one’s own application.

[211]      The Court agrees with Valence that there is no copyright on claim language.

[212]      What an inventor risks in borrowing language from others is to have his claims rejected by the Patent Office on the basis of 27(3) or because they become ambiguous or later voided by the Court on these bases. In this case, the Patent Examiner was satisfied that there was enough information to support these claims.

[213]      No precedent has been cited to support the position put forth by Phostech that such behaviour would constitute a misappropriation of another’s invention. I doubt very much that such situations were intended to be covered by ss. 53(1).

[214]      All these comments which may appear somewhat superfluous are made to address the frustration and almost outrage expressed by Dr. Gauthier when he saw that so many expressions used in his patent application had been included in the ‘366 Application, including the famous     “C-LiFePO4”.

[215]      That said, to use the words of Justice Walsh in Beloit Canada Ltd. v Valmet Oy (1984),   78 CPR (2d) 1 (TD) at p. 30,[112] it “take[s] very strong evidence indeed and not merely deduction from the documentary evidence and suggestions of motives” to establish that the named inventor is not the inventor of the invention described in the said patent.

[216]      This is especially so when it is not disputed that the inventors named in the ‘366 Patent were the authors of the disclosure of the ‘115 Patent Application filed before the ‘129 Application. It is on the basis of wording included in the said original disclosure that the Court was able to construe claim 26 of the ‘366 Patent.  Moreover, it is on the basis of this disclosure that experts testified that the posita would be able to practice the invention described in claim 26.

[217]      As mentioned earlier, there is little evidence from the inventors before the Court. Phostech filed by consent some extracts from the discovery of Dr. Barker, one of the three inventors named in the ‘366 Patent. There is little evidence as to the exact role played by Dr. Barker compared to that of the other two inventors in the development of the invention. Certainly, it appears from the correspondence before the Court that Dr. Barker felt that Yazid Saidi, one of the other inventors, could be of help in respect of some of the matters raised. Although no correspondence from Mr. Saidi was found, there is no evidence that he did not speak with the patent agent. Dr. Barker also directed some inquiries in relation to the making of the Valence product to Valence’s quality control department. It is evident from the few extracts produced that Dr. Barker does not have a good memory of details. It is most likely that he was indeed personally involved in drafting the disclosure of the ‘115 Patent.  He also probably chose the experiments reported therein. It is unlikely that he was involved at all in the drafting of the claims per se.

[218]      Phostech’s counsel focused on an answer to one of the questions put to him by the patent agent as to whether a particular wording used in the ‘129 Application (or the ‘466 equivalent) applied to the Valence product – did the Valence product have a core? His answer was “very difficult to tell”. Dr. Barker was never asked what he understood this question to mean exactly or whether he had with him a copy of the Armand application and, in any event, the reference to “core” was never used in the ‘366.

[219]      None of this evidence establishes to my satisfaction that the named inventors did not invent what is claimed in the ‘366 Patent.  No misrepresentation has been established in that respect.

[220]      I should also say that Phostech has not satisfied me either that I should infer an intention to mislead. The Court does not accept the leap proposed by Phostech’s counsel that Valence must have filed for a divisional to avoid having to deal with the patent examiner working on the ‘115 Application to by-pass some of the objections he had raised.  There are many other explanations for requesting a divisional, especially when one knows that a competitor is or will soon be on the market with a product that may infringe. One could want to get a first patent issued quickly with claims language that one knows is acceptable to the examiner.

 [221]      Phostech’s attack on the basis of ss.53(1) fails.  

Cour d’appel fédérale: confirme qu’OPIC ne peut pas accepter taxe de maintien d’une demande de brevet sans la bonne révocation/désignation d’agent

February 19, 2011

Unicrop Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FCA 55, (February 11, 2011)
http://decisions.fca-caf.gc.ca/en/2011/2011fca55/2011fca55.html

Selon la Cour, la loi est trop claire et, comme on dit en anglais, “leaves no wiggle room”

Développements en brevets au Canada 2010

January 25, 2011

Voirl’article de Gowlings

Entente ATDB OPIC-USPTO est prolongée pour une période indéterminée

January 18, 2011

Voir l’annonce de l’OPIC

Canada: Article sur obligation de bonne foi en brevets

January 18, 2011

Voir l’article publié par Bennett Jones sur le sujet

Programme québécois de démonstration de technologies vertes (PDTV) rembourse des frais d’obtention de brevets

January 15, 2011

Voir les détails du programme sur le site du MDEIE

Voici des extraits pertinents du programme:

1. Clientèle
Ce programme s’adresse aux entreprises légalement constituées et établies au Québec ayant développé ou adapté un procédé novateur ou une technologie émergente, ou détenant les droits sur un tel procédé ou technologie.

2. Projet
Les projets admissibles sont des démonstrations qui doivent être axées sur le développement de nouveaux procédés ou de nouvelles technologies ou l’adaptation de procédés ou technologies dont l’utilisation permet de limiter ou de corriger les dommages à l’environnement, incluant la détection et la mesure des contaminants.

Les démonstrations admissibles doivent être effectuées dans des situations réelles d’opération, au Québec ou ailleurs, et être réalisées sur une période maximale de 36 mois.

Les procédés ou technologies faisant l’objet des démonstrations admissibles doivent comporter un potentiel de commercialisation.

Aide financière et dépenses admissibles
L’aide accordée prend la forme d’une contribution non remboursable pouvant atteindre 50 % des dépenses admissibles. Le maximum est limité à 1 M$.

Les dépenses admissibles correspondent à l’ensemble des dépenses liées directement à la réalisation d’un projet pourvu qu’elles soient raisonnables et justifiables.

Elles peuvent comprendre :

    • les salaires;
    • les frais de demande et d’acquisition d’un brevet, d’une licence de fabrication ou de savoir faire;
    • les honoraires professionnels dont les frais associés aux services d’évaluation et de validation de la démonstration;
    • les coûts du matériel et des fournitures;
    • les coûts de location d’équipements;
    • les immobilisations et les dépenses d’amortissement;
    • les frais de déplacement et de séjour associés à la démonstration

 

CA: jurisprudence récente: la Cour fédérale accepte un argument pour rétablir une demande abandonnée pour faute de paiement de taxe de maintien

January 13, 2011

Repligen Corporation v. Canada (Attorney General), 2010 FC 1288, (December 15, 2010)

Faits:

-Taxe de maintien payée pour la demande 1, 314, 486 au lieu de 1, 341, 486;

-Demande 1, 341, 486 abandonnée pour faute de paiement de taxe de maintien

-Après la date limite pour rétablir la demande, les nouveaux agents tentent de rétablir la demande en invoquant l’article 8 de la Loi sur les brevets pour les erreurs d’écriture.

-Le Bureau des brevets refuse, ainsi que la Commission d’appel, mais la Cour fédérale renverse la décision

-Raisonnement de la Cour fédérale (intéressant potentiellement pour d’autres dossiers car on tente de se distinguer de Dutch Industries)

[57]           The purpose of section 8 of the Act is clear. It is a remedial section which enables the Commissioner in limited cases of clerical errors in any instrument of record to be corrected under the authority of the Commissioner taking into account all relevant considerations which, as the jurisprudence established, includes delay in seeking correction and the impact on third parties.

 

[58]           Based on the record before me, I find that the Commissioner failed to properly exercise her discretion in this particular case.

 

[59]           As I see it, the Commissioner took into account only two relevant factors: delay in seeking correction and possible third party prejudice. These two factors were in the Commissioner’s view determinative in refusing to correct what she found to be a clerical error. Her refusal to correct a clerical error had a catastrophic impact on Repligen – it lost its patent rights to its invention.

 

[60]           In my view, the Commissioner failed to take into account the following relevant factors before deciding in her discretion whether to correct the clerical error:

a)      The impact on Repligen – the loss of its patent;

b)      The fact Repligen’s payment was received by the Commissioner and appropriated to another patent in circumstances which are unknown to Repligen and which were not considered by the Commissioner and, in that context, whether there was a slip at CIPO;

c)      The fact that Repligen’s payments were made on the due date;

d)      Her failure to appreciate, that if she properly exercised her discretion to correct the error, the remedial scope of section 8 would have the effect that the ‘486 patent never lapsed for non-payment under paragraph 46(2) of the Act because those fees were paid in the appropriate amount and on time, a result which was achieved in Dutch Industries, above, without the recourse to section 8. In other words, she erred in her appreciation of the remedial powers available to her under section 8 of the Act;

e)      The Commissioner did not take into account the purpose and object of the maintenance fee provision in the Act. Repligen paid on time and CIPO accepted those payment; Repligen contributed to defraying the costs of the Patent office. The fact that Repligen made those payments and the Commissioner recognized that paying it to the wrong account was an indicator Repligen did not consider its ‘486 issued patent as deadwood;

f)        Simply invoking possible third party rights without more would, in my view, fundamentally impair the remedial power Parliament conferred upon the Commissioner to remedy clerical errors. The reason is obvious: in the case of every issued patent the disclosure will have been made; in the case of a patent application, it is open to the public inspection after a certain date. Justice Desjardins in Bristol-Myers did not endorse a speculative determination of third party rights. She had hard facts before her which pointed to the likehood third parties would be affected – the nature of the remedy sought which was the addition of a new priority date had the effect in a document, that had been opened in 1994, of permitting the entry in 1997 of a priority date of July 1992. Justice Desjardins said that “the retroactive effect of the correction if admitted, clearly preoccupied the Commissioner. She also had evidence that, before the correction was sought, two other companies filed priority claims for similar drugs under foreign patents predating the U.S. patents relied on by Bristol-Myers. Here, as I see it the Commissioner’s assessment of third parties rights being affected was based on pure speculation, without more, such as determination whether patent applications had been filed in Canada by third parties for patents similar to Repligen’s Modified Protein A. The view I take is consistent with what is written in CIPO’s Manual of Patent Office Practice at item 23.04.02 when giving examples of cases where third parties are likely to be affected. See also section 23.04 of that same Manual where the Commissioner indicates she will decide whether or not to correct based on the nature of the error made; and

g)      Finally, the Commissioner failed to weight and balance all relevant factors before exercising her discretion.