US: Article intéressant sur la structure des coûts au USPTO

Voir l’article proposé par foundpersuasive.com.

Collection de modèles d’ententes de collaboration et de licensing aux États-Unis en pharmaceutique

Un site développé par le canadien James Hatton et pointant à des documents disponibles typiquement sur le site du SEC aux É-U. Voir le lien.

Voir le blogue en licensing du même auteur qui pointe également à sa collection de documents de référence en licensing

Canada: jurisprudence récente en brevets

Confidentialité des présentations de drogues nouvelles dans les procédures d’avis de conformité:

1) EpiCept Corporation v. Canada (Health), 2010 FC 120, (February 4, 2010)

 

http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/en/2010/2010fc120/2010fc120.html

Une décision avec application de l’ancien article 43 de la Loi sur les brevets sur les conflits pour les demandes de brevets pre-1989 quand le système de “first-to-invent” existait encore au Canada.

Mycogen Plant Science, Inc. v. Bayer Biosciences N.V., 2010 FC 124, (February 5, 2010)

 http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/en/2010/2010fc124/2010fc124.html

Un bon exemple de comment un brevet US protège contre des distributions aux É-U de produits achetés en Chine

Voir SEB (T-Fal) v. Montgomery Ward & Co. (Fed. Cir. 2010)

Et le commentaire de Patently-o

USPTO: statistiques intéressantes

Voir un article de Patently-O sur le niveau d’expérience moyen des examinateurs de brevets

Voir un article de Patently-O sur les taux de renouvellement/paiement de taxes de maintien de brevets au USPTO

Webinaire sur la commercialisation de la recherche scientifique

Pour plus d’information sur les cours offerts par  the National Council Of Entrepreneurial Tech Transfer (NCET2) and the National Institutes of Health voir le lien suivant

Cours de formation sur le système PCT

Voir le cours de formation en ligne à distance développé par l’OMPI

Cours de maîtrise en transfert de technologie

Offert par l’Université de Sherbrooke – au campus Longueuil.

Voir le lien suivant pour plus de détails sur le programme.

Récents articles sur la commercialisation de PI

Exraits d’une collection mensuelle des Partenaires fédéraux en transfert de technologie:

 Commercializing Intellectual Property for Businesses, Technology and Intellectual Property Bulletin, Fasken Martineau, November 2009.  This bulletin provides an overview of some key elements of commercialization strategies which businesses can employ to maximize their return on investment when choosing to capitalize on their intellectual property’s commercial value. Read bulletin.

 Cronin, J. and DiGiammarino, P. “Understanding and unifying diverse IP strategy perspectives”, Intellectual Asset Management, January-February 2009, pages 22-26. In today’s economically uncertain era, a strong and unified IP strategy, combined with the ability to execute it, will reduce costs and risks while increasing company value. Read article.

Edwards Cronin, N., Bulakowski, A. and Bharucha, S. “Intellectual Asset Man agement Best Practices for Small Companies”, ipCapital Group, September 2009.The authors offer seven best practices as ways to achieve cost-effective intellectual property protection, given a small company’s limited resources. Read article.

 Shreve, N. and Breuer, T. “Clearing a Trademark for Use”, GC New York (New York Law Journal), May 2005.To search or not to search — that is the question! Or perhaps, “how thorough should the trademark clearance effort be,” more accurately describes the dilemma faced by inhouse counsel. Read article.

Des podcasts sur différents sujets en PI aux États-Unis

Produits par l’université Suffolk. Voir sur le lien suivant.

Exemple US d’une demande de brevet pour laquelle un des inventeurs refuse de signer la pétition

Voir l’article de Patently-o avec l’exemple de la pétition

Nouveau site de coordination entre le USPTO, EPO, JPO et autres bureaux de brevets majeurs

Le site a été développé pour montrer les travaux de coordination entre les “Major IP Offices”. Voir le site.

Canada: traduction de tous les abrégés de brevets – suite à un jugement cette semaine

C’est la conclusion de :

Picard c. Canada (Office de la propriété intellectuelle), 2010 CF 86, (26 janvier 2010) http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fr/2010/2010cf86/2010cf86.html

 Dont voici des extraits pertinents:

[74] De façon subsidiaire, les défendeurs soutiennent que les mesures qu’ils ont proposées en réponse au rapport du Commissaire aux langues officielles sont suffisantes. Ils insistent sur les coûts exorbitants d’une traduction de tous les brevets, qui seraient de l’ordre de 825 000 000 $. Ordonner une réparation aussi coûteuse reviendrait à substituer la Cour au parlement dans la détermination de la politique budgétaire.

 

 

79] Je rappelle qu’un brevet est un document qui s’adresse au public et l’informe. Si la traduction complète de tous les brevets, est difficilement réalisable, le Bureau des brevets doit à tout le moins rendre disponibles dans les deux langues officielles les abrégés des brevets, comme l’avait proposé le Commissariat aux langues officielles.

[80] Il s’agira, bien entendu d’une traduction non-officielle. Cependant, sa disponibilité constituera une « réparation convenable et juste eu égard aux circonstances », au sens que la Cour suprême a donné à cette expression dans l’arrêt Doucet-Boudreau c. Nouvelle-Écosse (Ministre de l’Éducation), 2003 CSC 62, [2003] 3 R.C.S. 3 aux pars. 55 à 58. Ainsi, elle permettra de défendre utilement les droits linguistiques du demandeur et de tous les Canadiens en leur donnant une bonne idée du contenu des brevets valides en effectuant une recherche préliminaire dans la langue officielle de son choix. Obliger le Commissaire à rendre disponibles les abrégés bilingues ne dépasse ni le mandat de la Cour dans notre système constitutionnel ni les limites de son expertise. De plus cette mesure n’imposera pas de grandes difficultés au Commissaire, puisqu’il ne s’agit, en somme, que d’une confirmation des mesures qu’il affirme lui-même avoir l’intention de prendre.

 

 

US: bons articles de formation sur la pratique américaine en brevets

Voir le site de patenteducation.com

Article sur les “Patent Term Extensions” au USPTO dû à une approbation règlementaire

Voir l’article de Darby & Darby

CA: Deux décisions d’automne 2009 sur le “duty of candour” au Bureau des brevets

Contraster la position du juge Hughes dans:

Mycogen Plant Science, Inc. v. Bayer Bioscience N.V., 2009 FC 1013 (CanLII)

[17]           I addressed the question of a duty of candour upon an applicant for a patent in dealing with the Patent Office in G.D. Searle & Co. v. Novopharm Ltd., 2007 FC 81 (CanLII), [2008] 1 F.C.R. 477, reversed on other grounds, 2007 FCA 173 (CanLII), [2008] 1 F.C.R. 529. I wrote at paragraphs 71 to 73:

 71     Since at least 60 years ago there has been a doctrine of good faith in respect of patents. President Thorson of the Exchequer Court in Minerals Separation North American Corporation v. Noranda Mines Ltd., [1947] Ex. C.R. 306, at page 317, said that the inventor must act uberrimae fide and give all information known to him that will enable the invention to be carried out to the best effect as contemplated by him.

72     A patent is a monopoly sought voluntarily by an applicant, there is no compulsion to do so. An application for a patent is effectively an ex parte proceeding, only the applicant and the Patent Office examiner are involved in dialogue. The patent, when issued, is afforded a presumption of validity by the Patent Act.

 73     A patent is not issued simply to afford a member of the public an opportunity to challenge its validity (see e.g. by way of analogy to revenue legislation Kingstreet Investments Ltd. v. New Brunswick (Finance), 2007 SCC 1 (CanLII), [2007] 1 S.C.R. 3, at paragraph 54). An obligation arises on those seeking to gain a patent to act in good faith when dealing with the Patent Office. The application for the patent includes a specification and draft claims. The specification is the disclosure for which the monopoly defined by the claims is granted. This disclosure, as the Supreme Court has said, should be full, frank and fair. Further disclosure made in dialogue with the Patent Office examiner. Since at least October 1, 1996, communications with the examiner must be made in good faith. It is to be expected that there will be full, frank and fair disclosure. There is afforded during the prosecution ample opportunity to make further disclosure or to correct an earlier misstatement or shortcoming. It is not harsh or unreasonable, if after the patent issues, and disclosure is found to lack good faith, that the Court deems the application and thus the patent, to have been abandoned.

 [18]           Justice Shore expressed a contrary opinion in Janssen-Ortho Inc. v. Apotex Inc. 2008 FC 744 (CanLII), 2008 FC 744 at paragraph 201:

201     It is clear that there is no express duty of candour contained in the Patent Act or the Patent Rules and that the word “candour” does not even appear in this legislation. While a duty of candour and good faith exists during the prosecution of patent applications in the United States Patent Office, a similar duty does not exist in Canada. The facts alleged by Apotex in its NOA are addressed by subsection 30(1) of the Patent Act and paragraphs 40(l)(a), 40(1)(c) and section 45 of the Patent Rules. There is no basis in Canadian law for the separate allegation of breach of candour put forth by Apotex. As the Federal Court of Appeal stated in Flexi-Coil Ltd. v. Bourgault Industries Ltd., the disclosure required “can only be… that which the statute, the rules and the jurisprudence already require. Furthermore, even if the duty of disclosure had been extended as suggested by counsel, the impact of the extension would be felt not at the level of the validity of the patent but at the level of the remedies where equitable considerations might come into play.” (Stewart Affidavit paras. 68-70, AR v. 29 Tab 42 p. 9081; Flexi-Coil Ltd. v. Bourgault Industries Ltd. 1999 CanLII 7650 (F.C.A.), (1999), 237 N.R. 74, 86 C.P.R. (3d) 221 at 231-232 (FCA), aff’ing 1998 CanLII 7338 (F.C.), (1998), 80 CPR (3d) 1, 78 A.C.W.S. (3d) 373 (F.C.T.D.).)

[19]           Given the uncertainty of the state of the law as to the duty of candour, I cannot find that it is plain and obvious that a plea of lack of candour cannot succeed if appropriate relief as a result can be claimed.

Par rapport à:

Lundbeck Canada Inc. v. Ratiopharm Inc., 2009 FC 1102 (CanLII)

[329]      Although it came to a different conclusion on the facts of the case, it is noteworthy that the Federal Court of Appeal in G.D. Searle did not take issue with Justice Hughes’ review of the law with respect to the duty of good faith in the prosecution of patent applications.  I accept Justice Hughes’ review as an accurate overview of the obligations on an applicant.  In particular, I agree with the analogy that he drew between an application for a patent and an ex parte court proceeding.

Temple de la renommée pour les inventeurs

Voir le site de Invent Now Hall of Fame

CA: Jurisprudence récente brevets avec bons résumés des principes de nouveauté, non-évidence, revendication trop large- “overbroad claims”

Schering-Plough Canada Inc. v. Pharmascience Inc., 2009 FC 1128, (December 22, 2009)
http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/en/2009/2009fc1128/2009fc1128.html

Extraits pertinents:

7.3.1.1.                        Principles of Anticipation

 

[66]           I begin this section of the Reasons by referring to the general legal principles of anticipation.

 [67]           The concept of anticipation arises from s. 28.2 of the Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.P-4. In short, this provision requires that the subject matter of a claim must not have been disclosed to the public before the claim date.

 [68]           Until the decision of the Supreme Court in Apotex v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, 2008 SCC 61, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 265, the test for anticipation followed by the Courts was as described in Beloit Canada Ltd. v. Valmet Oy (1986), 8 C.P.R. (3d) 289 (F.C.A.), at p. 297:

One must, in effect, be able to look at a prior, single publication and find in it all the information which, for practical purposes, is needed to produce the claimed invention without the exercise of any inventive skill. The prior publication must contain so clear a direction that a skilled person reading and following it would in every case and without possibility of error be led to the claimed invention.

 [69]           In Sanofi-Synthelabo, at paragraph 23, the Supreme Court determined that the trial judge, by using the Beloit test, “overstated the stringency of the test for anticipation that the ‘exact invention’ has already been made and publicly disclosed”. The Supreme Court concluded that the issue of whether an invention is anticipated by the prior art requires that the Court have regard to two questions:

 1.                  Was the subject matter of the invention disclosed to the public by a single disclosure?

 2.                  If there has been such a clear disclosure, is the working of the invention enabled by that disclosure?

 [70]           At the first step of the analysis, the Supreme Court provided the following guidance (at para. 25):

When considering the role of the person skilled in the art in respect of disclosure, the skilled person is “taken to be trying to understand what the author of the description [in the prior patent] meant” (para.32). At this stage, there is no room for trial and error or experimentation by the skilled person. He is simply reading the prior patent for the purposes of understanding it.

 [71]           Once disclosure has been made, the question of enablement was described by the Supreme Court (at para 27):

Once the subject matter of the invention is disclosed by the prior patent, the person skilled in the art is assumed to be willing to make trial and error experiments to get it to work. While trial and error experimentation is permitted at the enablement stage, it is not at the disclosure stage. For purposes of enablement, the question is no longer what the skilled person would think the disclosure of the prior patent meant, but whether he or she would be able to work the invention.

 [72]           In Abbott Laboratories v. Canada (Minister of Health) 2008 FC 1359, 337 F.T.R. 17, aff’d 2009 FCA 94, 387 N.R. 347 (referred to as Abbott, Hughes J), Justice Hughes undertook a helpful survey of the law of anticipation as it exists after Sanofi-Synthelabo, above. He summarized the legal requirements for anticipation as follows (at para. 75):

1.         For there to be anticipation there must be both disclosure and enablement of the claimed invention.

 2.         The disclosure does not have to be an “exact description” of the claimed invention. The disclosure must be sufficient so that when read by a person skilled in the art willing to understand what is being said, it can be understood without trial and error.

 3.         If there is sufficient disclosure, what is disclosed must enable a person skilled in the art to carry out what is disclosed. A certain amount of trial and error experimentation of a kind normally expected may be carried out.

 4.         The disclosure when carried out may be done without a person necessarily recognizing what is present or what is happening.

5.         If the claimed invention is directed to a use different from that previously disclosed and enabled then such claimed use is not anticipated. However if the claimed use is the same as the previously disclosed and enabled use, then there is anticipation.

 6.         The Court is required to make its determinations as to disclosure and enablement on the usual civil burden of balance and probabilities, and not to any more exacting standard such as quasi-criminal.

 7.         If a person carrying out the prior disclosure would infringe the claim then the claim is infringed.

 7.3.2.1.                        General Principles of Obviousness

 [97]           The term “invention” is defined in s. 2 of the Patent Act to include “any new and useful . . . composition of matter”. Pharmascience asserts that Claims 1, 6, 9 and 23 of the ‘136 Patent would have been obvious to a person skilled in the art, as of the relevant date.

 [98]           The test for obviousness was recently clarified by the Supreme Court of Canada in Sanofi-Synthelabo. Justice Rothstein, writing for a unanimous Court, adopted a four-step approach (above, at para. 67):

1.         (a) Identify the notional “person skilled in the art”; and, (b) identify the relevant common general knowledge of that person;

 2.         Identify the inventive concept of the claim in question or if that cannot readily be done, construe it;

 3.         Identify what, if any, differences exist between the matter cited as forming part of the “state of the art” and the inventive concept of the claim or the claim as construed;

 4.         Viewed without any knowledge of the alleged invention as claimed, do those differences constitute steps which would have been obvious to the person skilled in the art or do they require any degree of invention?

 [99]           As part of his analysis, Justice Rothstein stated that the so-called “obvious to try” test, derived from UK jurisprudence, should be approached cautiously and with the understanding that “obvious to try” means “very plain” or “more or less self evident”.

… I am of the opinion that the “obvious to try” test will work only where it is very plain or, to use the words of Jacob LJ., more or less self evident that what is being tested ought to work.

 For a finding that an invention was “obvious to try”, there must be evidence to convince a judge on a balance of probabilities that it was more or less self-evident to try to obtain the invention. Mere possibility that something might turn up is not enough.(Sanofi-Synthelabo, above, at para 65-66)

 [100]      If an “obvious to try” analysis is warranted, Justice Rothstein proposed a non-exhaustive list of factors that may apply (Sanofi-Synthelabo, above, at paras. 69-71):

1.         Is it more or less self-evident that what is being tried ought to work? Are there a finite number of identified predictable solutions known to persons skilled in the art?

 2.         What is the extent, nature and amount of effort required to achieve the invention? Are routine trials carried out or is the experimentation prolonged and arduous, such that the trials would not be considered routine?

 3.         Is there a motive provided in the prior art to find the solution the patent addresses?

 4.         Another important factor may arise from considering the actual course of conduct which culminated in the making of the invention.

 [101]      In the recent case of Apotex Inc v. Pfizer Canada Inc., 2009 FCA 8, 385 N.R. 148, at paragraph 29, the Federal Court of Appeal provided further guidance on the “obvious to try” notion.

The test recognized is “obvious to try” where the word “obvious” means “very plain”. According to this test, an invention is not made obvious because the prior art would have alerted the person skilled in the art to the possibility that something might be worth trying. The invention must be more or less self-evident.

 [Emphasis added.]

 [102]      Although the Supreme Court emphasized that flexibility is required in applying the “obvious to try” test, it appears well-settled that the Court should address all of the components, and applying flexibility where appropriate.

7.3.3.1.                        General Principles of Overbroad Claiming

 [131]      Finally, I will consider the allegation that Claim 23 is overbroad.

 [132]      A patent that claims more than that which was invented or disclosed is invalid for being overly broad (see, for example, Unilever PLC v. Procter & Gamble Inc. (1995), 61 C.P.R. (3d) 499 at 515 (F.C.A.); Eli Lilly Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 2009 FC 320, 75 C.P.R. (4th) 165, at paras. 52-53; Biovail Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Canada (Min. of Health & Welfare), 2005 FC 9, 37 C.P.R. (4th) 487, at para 15). An inventor ought not to claim a result rather than a means of achieving it. As stated in Free World Trust, above at paragraph. 32:

[T]he ingenuity of the patent lies not in the identification of a desirable result but in teaching one particular means to achieve it. The claims cannot be stretched to allow the patentee to monopolize anything that achieves the desirable result. It is not legitimate, for example, to obtain a patent for a particular method that grows hair on bald men and thereafter claim that anything that grows hair on bald men infringes.

 [133]      The consequence of overly-broad claiming is that the relevant claims will be invalid.

CA: Procédures de réexamen de brevet en sursis en attendant les résultats d’un procès de contrefaçon/attaque en validité

Prenbec Equipment Inc. v. Timberblade Inc., 2010 FC 23, (January 8, 2010)

Dont voici la conclusion pertinente: 

[48] Moreover, as stated earlier, when determining whether to grant a stay, preference should be given to the proceedings which are more comprehensive of the two. In this regard, for reasons expressed above, re-examination proceedings are unequivocally less comprehensive as compared to an infringement/invalidity action before this Court.

[49] For all of the foregoing reasons, I am therefore of the view that it is in the interest of justice that a stay of the re-examination proceedings be granted pending the outcome of the present action before this Court.

 

US: Record de brevets pour IBM en 2009

Voir l’article de IAM magazine avec les top 10 compagnies ayant obtenu des brevets aux É-U en 2009, ainsi que les domaines dans lesquels le plus de brevets s’obtient.